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Abstract:   
  
  How does international competition affect overseas outsourcing?  While it is 
commonly believed that international competition enables firms to desert high cost countries 
in favor of low wage locations, the frequency of such responses may be reduced if the 
movement of outsourcing activities involves sunk costs. To put these factors in perspective, I 
study the production decisions of participants in the U.S. overseas assembly program (OAP).  
A number of interesting regularities emerge.  First, the strong positive effect of prior 
participation on current OAP participation probabilities suggests that sunk costs influence 
outsourcing choices.  Such production persistence is especially strong among foreign 
assemblers who are responsible for completing a large percentage of value-added.  Second, 
increases in own-country costs and declines in competitor-country costs reduce participation 
probabilities. In addition, while these persistence and cost effects characterize all overseas 
assembly choices, these effects are much larger for outsourcing in developing countries.   
Finally, outsourcing responses appear to reflect differences in “market thickness”, as cost 
sensitivity generally rises with competitor presence.  Taken together, these observations 
provide empirical support for modeling approaches that feature search costs and partner 
availability as determinants of outsourcing decisions. 
 
JEL Codes: F1, F2  
Keywords: International Outsourcing, Production Decisions, Sunk Costs, Competition   1
Introduction 
  Recent empirical work demonstrates how producer decisions respond to growing 
competition from low wage countries. Measuring low-wage competition by product imports 
from low wage locations, Schott (2002) notes that U.S. exports declined for those products 
experiencing increased competition from low wage countries while Bernard, Jensen and 
Schott (2006) discover that U.S. plants, and especially those in relatively labor-intensive and 
low-wage sectors, were more likely to shut down when faced with increased low-wage 
competition.
1   
Given the large effects of cost competition on U.S. production choices one might 
expect that outsourcing trade would be especially sensitive to international cost pressures. 
However, while cost minimization implies that outsourcing firms will locate assembly 
operations in low cost countries, such responses may be smaller than popularly believed if 
the creation and maintenance of outsourcing relationships entail sunk costs. Such is the point 
of Grossman and Helpman’s (2005) work which demonstrates how a high wage country may 
nonetheless attract outsourcing firms if its wage disadvantage is offset by relatively low 
search or adaptation costs.    For this reason, it is important to empirically study the effects of 
sunk costs and cost competition on outsourcing decisions.
 2 
To examine outsourcing production decisions this paper studies the evolution of 
overseas assembly program (OAP) activities between 1980 and 1994.
3  This program 
                                                           
1 These papers define low wage competition by the value share or product share of imports arriving from 
countries with GDP per capita less than 5% of the U.S. level.  They also note other effects of competition 
with low wage countries.  Schott (2002) observes a greater degree of quality upgrading as indicated by 
increased export unit values, while Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) observe an increased probability that 
U.S. plants switch product lines. 
2 According to Hummels, Ishii & Yi (2001) vertical specialization accounts for 30 percent of all trade 
flows. Feenstra (1998), Ng and Yeats (2001) Yeats (2001) and Spencer (2005) for overviews of recent 
outsourcing trends and theories, or Gorg (2000) and Swenson (2005) for evidence on outsourcing volumes. 
3 By definition, overseas assembly products imported through the OAP program must include some U.S.-
origin parts, components or materials.  The OAP program currently operates under the 9802 rules of the   2
encompassed a diverse cross-section of U.S. outsourcing imports, as OAP assembly involved 
399 four-digit SIC industries, and 64 different countries.  While OAP imports do not include 
all U.S. outsourcing imports, they represented a non-trivial nine percent of U.S. imports 
during the sample period.   
  In contrast with Swenson’s (2005) study of overseas assembly export values, this 
paper studies the extensive margin, using a linear probability model to examine the factors 
that influenced whether a country participated in overseas assembly, or not. The results show 
that the probability of exporting OAP products was positively related to prior OAP 
participation, thus suggesting that sunk costs affected production decisions.  In the full 
sample past year participation was associated with a 21 percent increase in the current 
probability of OAP activity.  The probability of current participation also increased with 
declines in own-country costs or increases in competitor-country costs.  
  This paper also contributes to the literature on outsourcing by showing how country 
or industry characteristics influenced the degree of outsourcing market attachment, and how 
these differences line up with theoretical models of outsourcing.  On the industry dimension 
project scale, as measured by the foreign assemblers’ contribution to value-added, was 
positively related to the magnitude of production persistence.  This supports the idea that 
sunk search costs were larger for assembly operations that involved more tasks that 
contributed significantly to project success. 
On the country dimension, differences in country development are highlighted since a 
number of factors could cause cost sensitivity to differ with country development.
4 For 
example, if more developed countries produce more highly differentiated goods than those 
                                                                                                                                                                             
U.S. Harmonized Tariff system.  This analysis ends in 1994 since the 4-digit SIC data that are used to 
create the cost measures are not available for years after 1994.  
4 In related work, Blonigen and Davies (2004) and Blonigen and Wang (2005) show how FDI determinants 
differ for developed versus developing countries.   3
assembled in developing countries, cost changes may play a greater role in decisions 
regarding the more homogenous products assembled in developing countries.  Alternatively, 
if high-skill workers are less interchangeable and developed country assembly relies more 
heavily on high-skilled workers, frictions due to sunk costs of search and investment may 
help to insulate developed country operations from cost-based production shifts.  The 
empirical analysis confirms the importance of the development dichotomy, as developing 
country outsourcing assembly responded more vigorously to changes in own or competitor 
costs. 
  Finally, I test for “market thickness” externalities in outsourcing assembly, as related 
to competitor presence.  All else equal, the potential to switch from one partner to another 
depends on the availability of suitable partners in other countries.  For example, an 
appreciation of the Mexican Peso will diminish Mexico’s attractiveness as a location for 
outsourcing assembly.  However, since apparel firms have more potential partners in other 
countries than do firms in other industries, a Peso appreciation may cause more relocation in 
the apparel industry than in other sectors.  To search for this effect empirically, I define 
“market thickness” by the number of OAP country suppliers in an industry, and test whether 
competitor presence influenced cost sensitivity.  The results show that cost sensitivity was 
indeed higher in industries populated by a wider range of potential country suppliers. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  To motivate the regression analysis, 
section two provides a basic discussion of trade and outsourcing models, to highlight the 
potential role for sunk costs, and to describe country and industry characteristics that could 
enhance or reduce the overall sensitivity of outsourcing assembly to country costs.  Section 
three provides a model of outsourcing production decisions to guide estimation.  Section four 
describes the data and estimates the importance of own and competitor costs for outsourcing 
decisions.  A brief conclusion follows in section five.        4
2.  Modeling Outsourcing Decisions 
Cross-country differences in factor costs affect outsourcing incentives as firms 
choose the ideal location for each production stage involved in the creation of a final 
product.
5  However, while one expects outsourcing decisions to reflect country cost 
considerations, it is not clear that outsourcing production should respond to all changes in 
country production costs.  As Rauch (1999) notes, informational frictions appear to influence 
general trade volumes.  Similarly, an absence of full information about alternative country 
partner characteristics and abilities may deter firms from quick outsourcing partner switches 
when country costs change.    
Comparable search and informational issues underpin Grossman and Helpman’s 
(2005) model of outsourcing decisions.  While low wages in the South are attractive to 
producing firms, a firm’s decision to undertake costly search for outsourcing partners in the 
North or South is guided by expected profits.  For example, firms may seek partners in the 
high-wage North if the costs of information gathering and investment coordination in the 
South outweigh the South’s wage advantage.  Similarly, if firms experience cost increases in 
their current assembly location, we expect them to evaluate whether the expected cost 
savings from a partner search justify the sunk costs of searching for a new outsourcing 
partner. If search costs are non-negligible, outsourcing choices will be characterized by 
hysteresis.
 6    
Additional sunk costs may further inhibit rapid international sourcing changes.  As 
Grossman and Helpman (2005) describe, fruitful international outsourcing projects may 
require relationship-specific investments by potential foreign partners.  Since weaker legal 
                                                           
5  See Deardorff(2001) for a discussion of factor prices and outsourcing, or Yi (2003) for a Ricardian model 
of outsourcing that accounts for tariffs. 
6 For a discussion of hysteresis in trade, see Baldwin (1988), Baldwin and Krugman (1989), Dixit (1989), 
or Krugman (1989).   5
protections in the South make it difficult to ensure that Southern outsourcing partners will 
perform all necessary relationship-specific investments, lower Southern wages may be a 
symptom of the poor legal environment, rather than a special attraction for Southern 
outsourcing.
7  In addition, since the North’s strong legal environment ameliorates incomplete 
contracting problems the attractiveness of Northern operations may be further enhanced by 
“thick market” externalities.  In particular, as more firms search for outsourcing partners in 
the North, more potential partners locate in the North.  As a result, the increased density of 
potential partners in the North increases the probability that firms searching in the North will 
succeed in locating an appropriate partner. 
Overall, a message of these outsourcing models and the work on search costs more 
generally, is that the effects of cross-country cost differentials may be tempered by sunk costs 
of search and investment.  As a result, we need to empirically examine outsourcing decisions 
to put these economic factors in perspective. 
3.  An Estimation Framework for Assembly Decisions 
  To describe outsourcing production choices I modify Roberts and Tybout’s (1997) 
model of export decisions, which examines export choices in the presence of sunk entry 
costs.  Outsourcing operating profits are at the center of such a model.  We can model current 
operating profits for outsourcing assembly of industry i goods in country c as depending on 
production costs (ci) and competitor country costs (ci*), or π(ci, ci*).
8  Profits naturally rise 
when own country costs decline.  In contrast, reduced competitor costs, which force firms to 
respond by reducing sales and/or prices, are associated with declines in operating profits.    
                                                           
7   Since weak legal systems reduce Southern wages, Grossman and Helpman (2005) show that it is difficult 
to make simple predictions about the net effects of differential country legal effectiveness on outsourcing 
decisions.   
8 Time subscripts are initially dropped, though time-specific cost measures are used for estimation.   6
  As in Roberts and Tybout (1997) I assume that firms incur sunk entry costs related to 
market search or investment each time a new outsourcing relationship is created at the 
country-industry level. If outsourcing activities involve sunk costs, firms will engage in 
outsourcing when outsourcing this period increases firm value by an amount that is greater or 
equal to the fixed costs associated with the decision to engage in outsourcing production this 
period.
9     
  This basic description of outsourcing decisions generates a number of testable 
predictions.  First, the probability that country c engages in outsourcing assembly of industry 
i products will be positively related to operating profits.  In turn, this predicts that the 
probability of outsourcing will be negatively related to own-country costs, and positively 
related to competitor country costs.  Second, prior production decisions will influence current 
production decisions.  Since continuation of an outsourcing relationship does not entail fixed 
entry costs, as does the initiation or renewal of outsourcing assembly, outsourcing 
probabilities will be higher for country-industry pairs that previously had positive 
outsourcing activity.   Finally, if reentry costs are smaller than the sunk costs of fresh entry, 
earlier activities will also boost the probability of current activity, though the benefit of more 
distant activity may be weaker than the effects of activity in the prior period.   
  To capture these hypotheses, I examine whether country c assembled industry i 
outsourcing goods in year t, or Ycit = 1.  If there is no such assembly, Ycit = 0.  The 
probability of outsourcing this period depends on the profitability of assembling industry i, 
goods in country c.  Variables that influence profits, Xcit, include the cost of producing in 
country c, as well as the cost of producing goods in country c’s competitors.  
(1) Ycit =  α + βXcit + θ
1Y ci,t-1 + θ
2(1-Y ci,t-1)*Y ci,t-2 + λ c + δi + γ t + υ cit 
                                                           
9  The increase in firm value is equal to the discounted increase in firm value caused by the decision to 
outsource industry i goods in country c.   7
Estimating equation (1) also includes country, industry and time dummies, λc, δi, and γt to 
capture country attractiveness for outsourcing, general industry suitability for outsourcing 
assembly, and common shocks to outsourcing probabilities over time.  
  The coefficients on previous year production decisions, Yci,t-1 and Yci,t-2, test whether 
sunk costs influence outsourcing decisions.
10  In the absence of sunk entry costs, we predict 
θ
1 = θ
2 = 0.  In contrast, if outsourcing involves sunk entry costs, these coefficients should be 
positive.  Further, if sunk costs of reentry are smaller than those of initial entry, then recent 
outsourcing production will elevate current probabilities more than activity in the more 
distant past, or θ
1 > θ
2 > 0. 
  While specification (1) includes both country and industry effects, we may need to 
further control for country-industry effects.  In particular, cross-industry differences in 
comparative advantage imply that countries may be attractive for some types of outsourcing 
assembly, but not all.  For example, unobserved country characteristics may attract textile 
assemblers to Jamaica, while having no similar effect on assemblers in other industries.  If 
this is the case, the estimated coefficient on previous participation may be positive even if 
there are no sunk costs. To control for the country-industry dimension of unobserved 
attractiveness, regression specification (2) includes country-industry fixed effects, Φci.   
 
(2) Ycit =  α + βXcit + θ
1Y ci,t-1 + θ
2(1-Y ci,t-1)*Y ci,t-2 + γ t + Φci + ηcit. 
 
The new error term, εcit = Φci + ηcit, includes the iid error component ηcit.   
  There are many possible econometric approaches for estimating the outsourcing 
equations as represented in specifications (1) and (2). Following Bernard and Jensen (2004), I 
estimate outsourcing participation probabilities using a linear probability model. Since 
                                                           
10 I only report coefficients for production in the previous two years, since the coefficients for more distant 
lags were never statistically significant.  Roberts and Tybout (1997) also fail to find any significant effect 
for lags of more than two years.   8
random effects estimation yields biased and inconsistent estimates if unobserved outsourcing 
determinants are correlated with the country-industry effects, Φci, I estimate specification (2) 
using fixed effects techniques. 
4.  Data and Estimation 
4.1 Data and Summary Statistics 
The key data for this project are based U.S. OAP activity.  The dependent variable 
Ycit indicates whether a country exported OAP products to the U.S. in a 4-digit SIC industry 
in a given year. Since I am interested in including the effects of competitor costs on OAP 
production decisions, it is important to define which countries competed with each other, and 
in which industries.  To define competition, countries were classified as a potential supplier, 
or competitor for a particular 4-digit SIC industry if the country exported OAP products in 
that 4-digit SIC during any of the years in the sample period.  As Rodrik (1997) such a 
definition may exclude countries whose presence at the competitive fringe disciplined and 
influenced the universe of OAP producers, though they never managed to enter into OAP 
production.  However, the primary benefit of this definition is that it includes all known 
competitors, while excluding the bulk of countries who were never at risk of providing OAP 
goods during the sample years.
11    
  Table 1 displays the industry composition and competition characteristics of OAP 
data sample.  The breadth of OAP activities is evidenced by the fact that the U.S. purchased 
OAP imports in 399 of the 450 4-digit manufacturing industries. Across the 399 industries, 
the average number of competitor countries was 16.6, while the median was 13 competitor 
                                                           
11  Competitors were not defined by presence in general trade flows, since a country that successfully 
exports an item to the U.S. may or may not be capable of profitably engaging in OAP production.  For 
example, if the costs of exporting U.S. inputs to a distant location overwhelm that location’s assembly cost 
advantages, the country will never participate in OAP assembly, even if it exports final goods from that 
industry to the U.S.   A further disadvantage of using general trade flows to define competitors is that it  
effectively defines almost all countries as competitors in all industries, since U.S. imports were non-zero 
for almost all [(4-digit SIC)-country] pairs.   9
countries.  Nonetheless, while 4-digit products originated from both developed and 
developing locations - OECD countries shipped OAP products to the U.S. in 387 different 
industries, while non-OECD suppliers shipped OAP products in 357 industries - the typical 
OECD producer faced fewer competitors than did the typical non-OECD assembler of OAP 
products.
12  
If one examines the trade-weighted competitor counts displayed in the final three 
columns of Table 1 the difference in competition facing developing country OAP producers 
becomes more dramatic.
13 In particular, on a trade-weighted basis OECD producers of OAP 
products faced 31.4 competitor countries while non-OECD producers faced 41.9. Such 
differences are consistent with Bernard, Jensen and Schott’s (2006) observation that U.S. 
plants altered their product mix to reduce direct competition with low wage countries.  In 
particular, it appears that OECD producers concentrated their efforts in 4-digit industries that 
were characterized by fewer country competitors.   
To highlight differences in competition, activity and input choices across OAP 
producers, Table 2 displays OAP outsourcing characteristics for individual countries.  First, 
the production percent (Prodn %) columns list the percent of years in which a country 
provided products in the industry categories they ever exported OAP products in.  For 
example, if a country only sold one OAP item during the years studied, a production percent 
of 50% indicates that it was observed exporting that item to the U.S. for exactly half of the 
years in the sample.  The average for all country-industry pairs was 50.2 percent.
14  Table 2 
also displays trade-weighted competitor numbers.  Here cross-country variation is primarily 
                                                           
12  Countries were classified as developed if they became OECD members by 1985. Because OECD and 
non-OECD countries participated in slightly different sets of industries, the competitor averages for the two 
groups (7.7 for OECD and 10.2 for non-OECD assemblers) do not sum to the sample average of 16.6. 
13 The weighted values provide an average number of competitors for each 2-digit SIC industry, where the 
weight assigned to each 4-digit industry within its 2-digit SIC industry group is the real value of OAP 
imports of that 4-digit industry over the sample period.   10
driven by differences in product mix across countries.  For example, the number of 
competitors is especially high for countries such as Honduras or Guatemala, whose main 
OAP activities were concentrated in textiles and apparel.   
The last item displayed in Table 2 is the U.S. Percent, which is the percentage of 
OAP value-added attributable to U.S.-origin parts, components and materials.  While the 
trade-weighted sample average was almost 53 percent, there was a tremendous divergence 
between the 9.5 percent observed for the OECD assemblers, as compared with the 62.5 
percent for non-OECD participants in the OAP.  In addition, both distance and industry 
composition appears to have influenced the relative usage of U.S. inputs, since the reliance 
on U.S.-origin inputs was highest for OAP assemblers located in countries near the U.S., and 
for countries that were heavily engaged in OAP production of textile and apparel products.
15 
4.2  Empirical Implementation  
  A few issues must be addressed before the production equation can be estimated.  
The first is how to measure own and competitor costs.  The benefit of observing OAP 
imports is that knowledge about the operational features of OAP sourcing enables one to 
generate measures of own country costs that reflect country costs, input decisions, 
transportation costs, and tariffs.  These country-industry cost measures can then be combined 
with the country competition definitions to generate competitor cost measures.  
  As in Swenson (2005), I assume that OAP production is best characterized as a 
Leontieff production process that requires producers to complete a series of mi tasks that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
14   Positive import observations are generally clustered.  For country-industry observations that were 
positive, there was a 76% probability that the next period’s observation was also positive. 
15   The differences due to distance are likely to represent pure transportation costs, as well as issues related 
to time in transit and its implications for timely production.  See Evans and Harrigan (2005).  I do not 
include distance in the estimating equations, since the regressions include country or country-industry 
dummies which capture the effects of all country characteristics that remained constant over time.   11
must be performed in sequence.
16  The final task, mi, represents final assembly.  U.S. 
producers who produce for OAP complete tasks from 0 to αus.  The remaining tasks from αus 
to mi are completed overseas.  Participation in OAP reveals that the U.S. has comparative 
advantage in parts and components, while foreign countries have comparative advantage in 
the end of sequence tasks αus to mi which include assembly.  The position of αus differs for 
each country-industry as dictated by comparative advantage of the U.S. versus country c in 
industry i.  The position is also influenced by issues of cost minimization in light of tariff and 
transportation costs.  
  Total production requires Li units of labor.  Assuming that each of the mi tasks 
requires Li/mi units of labor, and U.S. labor costs wus  while  foreign labor costs wc,  
production cost is:
17 
(3)   Production Costic = [αus,ic*wus + (1- αus,ic)*wc)]* Li 
  Production costs are augmented by transportation costs and tariff surcharges.  The ad-
valorem shipment cost gic applies to the import of the final good to the U.S. It also applies to 
the shipment of U.S. intermediate inputs that are assembled in the overseas facility.  Since the 
OAP program stipulates that U.S. origin parts are exempt from tariff, the U.S. import tariff τi 
applies only to the foreign portion of value-added.  The resulting cost of producing industry i 
OAP products in country c is:
 18 
 (4)   Cic  = [αus,ic*wus + (1- αus,ic)*wc)]* Li * [1+gic (1+ αus,ic)+ (1- αus,ic)*τi].   
 
                                                           
16 The traditional literature on vertical integration uses a Leontieff production structure.  See Greenhut and 
Ohta (1979), or Mendez (1993) for an application to OAP. Yi (2003) creates a more elaborate three stage 
production structure.     
17  Time subscripts are omitted for simplicity. 
18 Formula 4 was used to create the own and competitor cost regressors. The data appendix provides further 
details on the creation of the cost measures.  Since I assume that the total labor requirement is the same for 
all locations, Li can be viewed as a scaling factor that has no effect on relative country attractiveness.  As a 
result, I can remove Li from (4) when I generate the cost measures, which is convenient since there are no 
good measures of Li.   12
  Competitor costs were calculated as competing country costs Cic weighted by the real 
value of OAP imports Vci for all countries c producing in industry i. Thus, the competitor  
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  A second implementation issue arises since the theory is based on firm-level 
outsourcing decisions while the data are available at the industry level.  Industry data may 
still provide insight into firm issues if all firms producing industry i goods in county c make 
similar decisions.  This is most likely if their decisions are guided by common shocks and 
characteristics, such as a large shock to the host country’s exchange rate combined with 
commonality of sunk search costs.  The high rates of entry and exit from OAP production at 
the industry level suggest that firms do make similar decisions or that many country-industry 
observations were based on a single firm’s activities. Alternatively, if the sunk cost efforts of 
one firm yield information for all potential producers, industry decisions may reflect single 
firm efforts.  For example, if one firm decides to assemble shoes in Indonesia, its actions may 
provide costless information to other shoe firms.  Ultimately, while firm level data is ideal, its 
absence forces us to cautiously draw inferences from the available data. 
The final implementation issue relates to timing.  As the J-curve in international trade 
suggests, trade relationships generally respond to cost changes with a lag.  If OAP 
outsourcing involves search and set-up time, as well as a time-lag associated with the 
termination of old contracts, current production decisions are likely to reflect cost 
information from earlier periods.  As a result, I use lagged cost measures to represent the cost   13
information guiding current production decisions.  For this reason, the own and competitor 




The results displayed in Table 3 support the idea that sunk costs shaped outsourcing 
decisions.  For example, the OLS estimates in column (1) show that OAP outsourcing 
probabilities were 45 percent higher for country-industry combinations that involved OAP 
production in the preceding period.  However, this correlation will also arise if there are 
unobserved factors in country c’s production of industry i goods that gives the country a 
productivity advantage over other country locations. Such productivity differences could be 
driven by differences in the costs of doing business in alternative locations, or they could 
reflect differences in country abilities to produce in particular industry.  Indeed, since further 
regressions indicate the presence of persistent country-industry advantages, the remaining 
analysis includes a full set of country-industry fixed effects.
20 
  In the full sample, fixed effects estimation suggests that countries that produced for 
OAP had a greater probability of producing OAP products in the same industry in the 
following year, though the benefit is now 21 percent in magnitude.  Since the effect of OAP 
production two periods earlier loses significance in the fixed effects setting it appears that 
more distant OAP experience was not an important factor in current OAP participation 
decisions.  This may be because sunk costs were based on firm-level sunk costs of 
information-gathering and firm-level relationship-specific investments, rather than general 
                                                           
19 The regression fit is best when costs are measured with two lags, rather than one.  However, the 
qualitative results are unaffected by the choice of lag length. 
20 When the regressor (Producet-1)*(Own-Cost) is added to the basic OLS regression, it has a negative and 
significant coefficient of -.153(.012).  This indicates that part of the observed production persistence arises 
from unobserved sources of country-industry advantage.   14
sunk costs at the country level.  Since OAP activity lagged two years has no explanatory 
power, the two-year lag is dropped as a regressor from this point onward.
21 
The results also show that a country’s probability of producing OAP products fell 
when its costs increased, and increased when competitor costs rose.  In the full sample, a one 
standard deviation increase in own costs would cause current production probability to 
decline by 7.5%  This result is consistent with other work on competition in international 
trade, such as Goldberg and Knetter’s (1995) demonstration that export volumes decline 
when competitor costs decrease, or Bernard, Jensen and Schott’s (2006) discovery that 
competition with low-wage exporters diminishes and alters the exports of U.S. plants. 
Finally, changes in capital-intensity affected OAP countries differentially by country 
type.  In particular, while OAP producers in developed countries experienced an increased 
probability of producing OAP products when capital-intensity rose, the production 
probabilities for developing country OAP producers were negatively correlated with 
increases in capital- intensity.
22  
Development and Sourcing 
  There are many reasons why developed and developing country outsourcing may 
respond differently to changes in economic factors.
23  First, if assembly in low wage 
locations utilizes more unskilled labor, and low-skilled workers are more easily substituted 
across countries than are high-skilled workers, then cost shifts are likely to foster more 
                                                           
21 Creation of lagged variables reduces the size of the data set used in estimation.   Thus, use of a single lag 
brings the additional benefit of expanding the data panel to include OAP export decisions in 1981.  
    If column (3) of Table 3 is re-estimated after adding 2-period lags of participation, the coefficients on 
Yci,t-2 are .004(.008) for developed and .003(.008) for developing countries, both of which are statistically 
insignificant. 
22  These results may also reflect reverse causality if U.S. industries become more capital-intense over time 
as they shifted less labor-intense activities overseas.   
23   Swenson’s (2005) study of outsourcing trade volumes uncovers differential effects for developing and 
developed countries.   15
relocation in developing country outsourcing assembly.
24  Second, greater skill abundance in 
developed countries may enable developed country assemblers to produce goods that are 
more highly differentiated from their competitors.  Thus, if products assembled in developing 
countries are generally more substitutable than those assembled in developed countries, cost 
changes are likely create greater relocation pressures for developing country producers.   
Finally, differences in infrastructure, and the availability of information will affect the sunk 
costs of information gathering.  If these factors differ systematically with country 
development, then the effects of sunk costs, and hence production persistence, will be 
different for the two sets of countries.   
  When OAP production responses are allowed to vary by country development two 
differences stand out.  First, as the third column of Table 3 shows, the effects of own cost 
increases are more detrimental to developing country assembly operations.  Second, past 
production exerts a greater positive effect on the probability of conducting current OAP 
production in developing countries, which suggests that sunk costs are larger for OAP 
operations in developing countries.  In a search context, this may imply that it is more 
difficult and costly to identify suitable partners in developing countries than it is to locate 
partners in developed locations.    
Industry Characteristics and Production Persistence 
  Table 4 examines whether OAP production persistence was related to underlying 
industry characteristics in a fashion that supports sunk cost arguments.  To begin, it is natural 
to ask whether sunk costs were larger in capital-intense industries, since capital-intensity 
indicates that production is likely to involve greater investment in capital.  In addition, if 
capital-intense industries involve more complex production processes, it may be more costly 
                                                           
24 Head and Ries’s (2002) examination of Japanese multinationals suggests that Japanese firms hire more 
unskilled workers in low-income locations, and higher skilled workers in high-income locations.   16
to search for partners who possess the skills required by such projects.  To test whether 
production persistence varied with industry capital-intensity, I added an interaction term 
between previous participation and capital-intensity.  However, the coefficients displayed in 
column (1) of Table 4 indicate that capital intensity had no effect on the importance of 
continuity in current production decisions. 
  An alternative possibility is that production persistence is driven by sunk costs are 
associated with partner importance, where partner importance is gauged by the fraction of 
project value that originates in the U.S.  For example, if the U.S. percentage of project value-
added is high it may be easier to locate another assembler who is capable of performing the 
assembly tasks, since the foreign assembler’s contribution to value-added is small.  In 
contrast, if the foreign assembler makes a substantial contribution to value-added it may be 
more difficult to locate alternative partners who are capable of performing the full range of 
tasks performed by the current partner.  To test this idea, the regression reported in column 
(2) of Table 4 includes an interaction between the U.S. percentage of project value-added, 
and the dummy for previous year participation.  The new results indicate that the value of 
previous participation was lower when the U.S. percentage was high: previous OAP activity 
had a larger effect on current participation probabilities when foreign producers were 
responsible for a relatively large portion of project value. Presumably, foreign assemblers 
making small contributions were more easily replaced, since the sunk costs of finding another 
bit-partner and organizing the new partnership were lower.
25   
  The results in Table 2 suggested that previous period OAP participation elevates 
current participation probabilities by 13 percent for developed countries, and 29.2 percent for 
developing countries.  If one accounts for the different input choices of developing and 
                                                           
25 Due to its significance, the interaction term based on the fraction of U.S. value-added is included in all 
regressions from this point onward.   17
developed country producers, by using the trade-weighted input averages taken from Table 2, 
the difference in production persistence for developing and developed countries narrows a 
small amount.  Nonetheless, the OECD producer’s benefit of previous participation – a 16.2 
percent increase in current production probability - is still smaller than the non-OECD 
producer’s benefit, which is a 24.1 percent increase in production probabilities due to 
previous period production. 
  To evaluate whether the regression predictions from the linear probability model 
were reasonable, I calculated the probabilities that were implied by the results.  For example, 
the predicted probabilities based on the specification displayed in column (2) of Table 4 are 
all positive, taking values that range from .007 to 1.16.  However, most observations have 
predicted probabilities that are closer to our expectation.  The median prediction of .467 is 
close to the sample average of .502.  Further, most predicted values were in a much tighter 
range: the predicted probability for the bottom 1st percentile in the sample was .236 and .963 
for the top 99th percentile in the sample.  If the sample was broken down based on country 
development, the predicted probability for OECD producers was .482, which was only 
slightly lower than the true probability of .511.  Among non-OECD producers, the prediction 
of .520 was close to the true probability of .494.   
Search and Market Thickness 
Market thickness effects are central to Grossman and Helpman’s (2005) and 
McClaren’s (2000) descriptions of outsourcing, since market thickness influences the relative 
attractiveness of searching in one market versus another, of searching for a partner versus 
conducting more expensive FDI production of inputs, or the attractiveness of engaging in 
outsourcing through arm’s-length arrangements.  One way to characterize market thickness 
for OAP markets is to measure “thickness” by the count of countries producing products in a 
particular 4-digit industry, and assuming that a higher number of country assemblers   18
represents “market thickness”.  Grossman and Helpman (2005) show that a greater density of 
partners in one country increases the likelihood that firms will search there.  Similarly, a 
higher presence of potential partners outside the current assembly location should increase 
the probability that firms will be willing to make a search if cost conditions change.  In each 
case, all else equal, firms that have more potential partners should be more inclined to search, 
since the increased probability of locating a suitable partner increases the expected profits 
associated with search. 
 I incorporate “market thickness” in the estimating equation by adding interactions 
between the cost terms and competitor counts.  Further, given the dichotomous results for 
assembly in developing and developed countries, I use tests that are based on two different 
competitor counts at the industry level.  The first defines competition by all OAP producers, 
while the next is based on developing country OAP producers alone.
 26   
When competition is defined by all OAP producers, the results in column (1) of Table 
5 show that greater market thickness increases the sensitivity of developing country 
participation probabilities to own-country costs.  However, a better regression fit is achieved 
when competitors are defined using counts of developing country producers.  Under this 
definition, the results displayed in column (2) of Table 5 indicate that market thickness in the 
number of developing country competitors had an especially strong effect on cost sensitivity 
for developing country producers.  The effects of competitor costs also depend on market 
thickness:  when there are more producers in the market, a country’s production probability 
rises by a larger amount when the average cost of its competitors rises.
27   
                                                           
26   Developing country counts capture the flavor of low-wage competition examined in Bernard, Jensen, 
and Schott (2006), and Schott (2002).  However, it is not possible to use the same set of countries to define 
low-wage competition, since these countries were generally absent from OAP assembly. 
27  The effect of competitor cost changes, when measured by the linear representation {φ1+φ2*[#of 
Competitors]}, has the undesirable implication that competitor cost rises reduce production probabilities for 
producers in industries that had few competitors, while it increased the production probabilities the most   19
 
5.0 Conclusions 
  This paper analyzes how competition and production persistence influenced OAP 
outsourcing decisions.  While OAP participation probabilities fall when a country's own costs 
rise and rise when competitor countries’ costs increase, the data suggest that outsourcing 
decisions are not without friction.  In the full sample, the U.S. was 21 percent more likely to 
engage in OAP assembly in a country-industry, where it had OAP assembly in the previous 
year.  The fact that OAP outsourcing probabilities are positively related to previous OAP 
participation suggests that sunk costs have a large effect on OAP assembly location choices, 
thus contributing to the mounting evidence of sunk cost effects in export relationships more 
generally.
28 
  The results also show that the degree of market attachment is related to country and 
industry characteristics which are featured in models of outsourcing.  Most notably, previous 
participation and cost changes exert a larger effect on outsourcing assembly operations in 
developing countries. The differential in cost sensitivities implies that developing country 
operations are more easily substituted across country locations, while the differential 
sensitivity to previous production decisions suggests that outsourcing projects in developing 
countries involve larger sunk costs of learning about partners, and in making relationship-
specific investments. The benefits of previous participation are especially large when the 
foreign assembler makes a significant contribution to the overall project’s value-added.     
                                                                                                                                                                             
for producers in industries with a large number of competitors.  Based on the mean number of competitors 
facing producers in this sample, the predicted effect is positive, as expected.  
    If Table 5’s regressions are re-estimated, with a single coefficient on the direct effect of competitor cost, 
the coefficient is positive and significant as before.  While the remaining coefficients are unaffected, the 
direct effect is .080 for developed countries, and .044 for developing countries in both regressions 1) and 2) 
of Table 5.  However, removing the linear representation based on competitor presence reduces the 
regression R
2’s considerably, to .066 and .110, respectively.   20
  In addition, outsourcing responses also appear to reflect differences in “market 
thickness”.  When industries are characterized by the number of alternative OAP outsourcing 
partners, the detrimental effects of own-cost increases were found to be more pronounced in 
“thick markets”, with sensitivities that were again largest for developing country producers.  
Taken together, these observations provide empirical support for modeling approaches that 
feature search costs or partner availability as determinants of outsourcing decisions. 
   In relating these results to outsourcing more generally, it is important to remember 
that the OAP program is designed to facilitate foreign assembly of final products that 
incorporate U.S. materials or components.  If OAP assembly is generally less complex than 
other forms of outsourcing, then the outsourcing frictions described by Grossman and 
Helpman (2005) are likely to reduce country relocation even further in other outsourcing 
contexts.  Nonetheless, while sunk costs of search or investment may slow the country 
relocation of outsourcing operations, it is important to remember that outsourcing assembly is 
still likely to move towards the lowest cost locations in the long run.  In this sense, search 
costs may temper the volatility and disruption associated with changes in international 
production patterns, even if industries inevitably migrate in particular directions. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
28 Aside from Das, Roberts and Tybout (2006), who use a structural model and rich firm level information 
to identify sunk costs in export decisions, Roberts and Tybout (1997), Campa (2004) and Bernard and 
Jensen (2004) provide indirect evidence that supports sunk cost theories of exporting.   21
 
 
































399  16.6  387 7.7 357  10.2  35.6  31.4  41.9 
           
SIC  20  27 2.9 23 1.8 13 2.8 9.4 6.1 9.9 
SIC  22  28  11.6  28 4.3 27 7.6  53.3  12.3  55.8 
SIC  23  33  35.6  33 8.9 33  26.7  52.6  52.2  52.7 
SIC  24  17 8.5 17 4.6 14 4.8  21.0  9.5  23.7 
SIC  25 13 25 13 11 13 14  25.1  25.1  25.2 
SIC  26  15  12.5  14 7.1 15 5.9  24.1  18.4  24.4 
SIC  27  13 6.5 13  4  8  4 18.4  15.1  18.7 
SIC  28  23 4.9 19 3.7 19 2.2 6.8 7.8 5.6 
SIC 29  5  5   4  3.5  5  2.2  7.9  7.8  7.9 
SIC  30  6 21 6 9.5 5 14  26.9  34.1  26.3 
SIC  31  11  17.8  10 4.8 11  13.5  27.3  30.8  27.2 
SIC  32  20 5.1 20 2.8 15 3.1  10.3  11.3  9.5 
SIC  33  25  16.3  25 9.6 22 7.5  25.6  15.1  38.1 
SIC  34  32  12.6  32 7.4 30 5.5  21.6  18.5  23.8 
SIC  35  44 19.2 44 11.4 42  8.1 37.0  34.2  41.0 
SIC  36  39 27.8 39 12.2 39 15.6  24.4  41.1  43.7 
SIC  37  16 19.6 16 10.6 14 10.2  31.4  31.1  34.5 
SIC  38  13 29.5 13 14.1 13 15.5  33.8  32.4  34.4 
SIC  39  18  16.9  18 6.5 18  10.4  28.1  22.4  28.7 
"# of SICs" is the count of 4-digit industries in each 2-digit industry category.  “Count” is the count of 
countries who exported products within a 4-digit SIC industry category during the sample period.  
“Count OECD” and “Count non-OECD” is the count of only OECD or non-OECD country providers.  
Average Counts (Avg. Count) represent the average over 4-digit SIC industries within a 2-digit SIC 
industry.  “Trade Weighted Competitor Numbers” are trade weighted number of competitors, of all 
origins, faced in the sample as a whole (All column) or by OECD or non-OECD providers.  
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TABLE 2: CHARACTERISTICS OF COUNTRY OAP PROVISION. 
Country  Prodn %  Comp #  US %  Country  Prodn %  Comp #  US % 
Argentina 12.0 24.8  59.5  Japan  44.7 32.0  3.7 
Australia 25.9  32.0  6.4  Malaysia  34.4  50.5  50.8 
Austria 16.9  31.8  28.0  Mauritania  23.7  40.5  71.6 
Barbados 70.5  50.3  66.4  Mexico  71.1 38.4  53.7 
Belize 83.4  58.9  71.2  Morocco  14.8  38.6  39.4 
Belgium 26.3  31.0  4.0  Mozambique  40.5  34.6  49.9 
Bangladesh 12.3  41.9 8.5  Mauritius  19.3  45.0 33.4 
Bolivia 15.7  36.2  90.1  Nepal  20.2  60.4  4.8 
Canada 71.6  31.0  27.3  Netherlands 27.7  29.8  22.8 
Chile 17.8  40.6  30.3  New  Zealand  13.5  29.1  15.6 
China 27.5  33.9  13.3  Norway  15.6  20.7  31.3 
Colombia 40.3  55.0  56.5  Pakistan  9.7  38.4  12.2 
Costa Rica  44.3  52.2  68.9  Panama  32.1  55.4  59.4 
Denmark 20.3  33.8  8.2  Peru  18.8  44.7  61.1 
Domincan 
Republic 
47.2 51.7  68.4  Philippines 38.8  47.5  50.1 
Egypt 20.8  48.5  7.4  Poland 23.2  41.0  20.2 
El Salvador  44.7  52.3  60.0  Portugal  19.4  39.4  34.9 
Finland 16.4  25.5  16.0  Romania 12.5  46.5  9.5 
France 36.7  24.9  12.4  Sierra  Leone  45.6  55.2  68.6 
Germany 40.1  32.1  2.2  Singapore 38.8  48.2  27.5 
Greece 27.9  37.0  55.0  South  Africa  14.1  38.4  35.4 
Guatamala 52.3 59.8  52.5  South  Korea  37.0  37.5  22.8 
Guyana 58.0  59.7  67.9  Spain  16.4  37.4  18.6 
Haiti 66.8  46.5  69.8  Sri  Lanka  29.6  45.5  21.8 
Honduras 51.6  56.1  71.6  St. 
Kitts/Nevis 
53.9 49.2  64.8 
Hong Kong  23.2  49.9  36.6  Sweden  34.2  31.6  3.0 
Hungary 20.3  34.9  18.7  Switzerland  29.0  29.8  20.8 
Indonesia 22.0  40.5  37.4  Thailand  24.4 46.9  54.4 
Ireland 30.0  42.0  26.2  Trinidad 54.7  49.5  43.8 
Israel 17.3  16.6  42.9  Turkey  18.3  60.0  3.2 
Italy 36.4  26.6  22.1  United 
Kingdom 
40.6 28.9  11.0 
Jamaica 46.9  48.4  76.1  Venezuela  12.6  33.2  64.2 
All 
Countries 
50.2 35.6  52.9  OECD 
Countries 
51.2 31.4  9.5 
       non-OECD 
Countries 
49.4 41.9  62.5 
Notes: Prodn % is the percentage of country-industry-year observations that were positive for country-industry 
pairs that were ever observed in the OAP dataset.  Comp # and US % are weighted averages, which use the 
real value of country-industry OAP imports as weights. Comp # describes the average number of country 
competitors, while US % reports the average US contribution to product value relative to the total product 





Table 3:  The Effects of Cost Competition on Production Decisions. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 OLS  FE  FE 













































































2 .440  .122  .263 
Observations 44,167  44,167  47,936 
Notes: Standard Errors in ( ).  The subscripts 
a and 
b represent statistical 
significance at the 1 and 5 % respectively. 
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Table 4:  The Effects of Industry and Production Characteristics on 
Production Decisions. 
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Controls  Year, Country-SIC4  Year, Country-SIC4 
R
2 .262  .235 
Observations 47,936  47,936 
Notes: Standard Errors in ( ).  The regressions are estimated by fixed effects [FE]. 
The subscripts 
a and 
b represent statistical significance at the 1 and 5 % respectively. 
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Table 5: The Effect of Competition on Production Cost Sensitivity. 
 
 (1)  (2) 
 Developed  Developing  Developed Developing 

























      
Competitor Count  All Producers  Developing Country 
Producers 
Own Cost t-2 
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Controls  Year, Country-SIC4  Year, Country-SIC4 
R
2 .120  .123 
Observations 47,936  47,936 




c represent statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % respectively.  




The import data are taken from United States International Trade Commission (USITC) 
reports on 806/807 and 9082 imports.  Between 1980 and 1988 the data on OAP import 
values originate from information on 806/807 imports from the Tariff Schedule of the United 
States, and the provisions of 9802 under the Harmonized System for the years 1989 to 1994.  
The product level data from these programs were then aggregated to the 4-digit SIC industry 
using the concordance constructed by Robert Feenstra, and available from the National 
Bureau of Economic Research, at http://www.nber.org/data_index.html. 
  
The relative contribution of U.S.-origin parts and materials is computed as declared inputs 
that are U.S. origin divided by the full declared value of the OAP imports.  When I construct 
equation (4) cost measures industry-country sample averages of αus,ic are used.  While 
Feenstra, Hanson and Swenson (2000) note that country costs affect U.S. input shares (αus,ic) 
of OAP producers, the small size of these responses support the Leontieff assumption. 
 
Country Variables 
The real price of GDP taken from the Penn World Table at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/, was 
used to measure country costs in the production cost equations.  While the equations are 
based on wages, country costs were selected for two reasons.  First, since production includes 
more than wages, country price levels may provide better insight into the cost of input 
bundles.  Second, the availability of the price data for more years and countries makes it an 
attractive candidate for this project. Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn 
World Table Version 6.1, Center for International Comparisons at the University of 
Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002.   
 
Industry Characteristics 
Transportation costs were constructed from Robert C. Feenstra’s data “U.S. Imports and 
Exports by 4-digit SIC Industry, 1958-94” which are posted and described at 
http://data.econ.ucdavis.edu/international/usixd/usixd4sic.html.  I assume that the cost of 
transporting inputs in industry i is the same as the cost of transporting final goods in industry 
i, since there is no detailed information on composition of input trade that would enable me 
to apply transportation costs for U.S. inputs that are shipped abroad for foreign assembly.    
Tariff data were taken from Chris Magee’s  “U.S. Tariffs at the SIC Level, 1974-1988, which 
are available from data.econ.ucdavis.edu/international/ustariff.html.  Since the tariff series 
ends before the time analyzed, the 1987 tariff is used for each industry.  Data on U.S. 
industry characteristics were collected from the NBER Manufacturing Database, at 
http://www.nber.org/data_index.html, as constructed by Bartlesman, Becker and Gray.   
Industry capital intensity was measured by capital/output.   
 
 
Summary Statistics for Measure of Own Cost   [SD = standard deviation] 
 
Variable Name        Full Sample Mean(SD)  OECD Mean(SD)  non-OECD Mean(SD) 
 
Own  Cost   4.578    4.755    4.426 
   (.317)    (.201)    (.319)   27
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